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   <subfield code="a">Fiscal Policy, Deficits and Politics of Subnational Governments: The Case of the German Laender</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">The first part of the paper briefly describesinstitutional aspects of the German federal system andexamines the economic and fiscal performance of theGerman Laender since 1970. Taking into account theinstitutional settings, especially the fact that theGerman Laender cannot set tax rates individually, wedevelop a highly stylized model of subnationalgovernments that do not have access to the tax rateinstrument and thus have to use expenditures as apolicy variable. The model implies an expendituresmoothing policy of subnational governments andcomplements the famous tax smoothing model. Theempirical section examines whether governments ofvarious ideology show significant differences infiscal stabilization policy. Our results indicatethat regional differences in public debt accumulationand public expenditure policy in general is largelydetermined by interregional differences in economicperformance, whereas we do not find any significantimpact on the ideological composition of the Laendergovernments.</subfield>
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