caa a22 4500 475840933 CHVBK 20180406123901.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170329e20000301xx s 000 0 eng 10.1023/A:1005016001877 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1023/A:1005016001877 Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions for a European Monetary Union [Elektronische Daten] [Roel Beetsma, A. Bovenberg] This paper explores the conditions under which aEuropean Monetary Union (EMU) is an optimum currencyarea. The scope for an EMU increases with theconvergence of structural and fiscal policies, smallmoney holdings, a conservative European Central Bank,and dependent national central banks. How nationalpolicies affect the rest of the union once the EMU hasbeen established is also investigated. The case forsurveillance of national structural and fiscalpolicies appears to depend mainly on the monetaryarrangements in the union. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000 Beetsma Roel Department of Economics, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB, Amsterdam, The Netherlands aut Bovenberg A. Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE, Tilburg, The Netherlands aut Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers 102/3-4(2000-03-01), 247-269 0048-5829 102:3-4<247 2000 102 11127 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005016001877 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005016001877 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Beetsma Roel Department of Economics, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB, Amsterdam, The Netherlands aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Bovenberg A. Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE, Tilburg, The Netherlands aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers 102/3-4(2000-03-01), 247-269 0048-5829 102:3-4<247 2000 102 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence SWISSBIB 300685084 BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer