caa a22 4500 475841131 CHVBK 20180406123901.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170329e20000601xx s 000 0 eng 10.1023/A:1005020606153 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1023/A:1005020606153 Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models [Elektronische Daten] [Stephen Ansolabehere, James Snyder Jr.] Spatial models of two-party or two-candidatecompetition almost never have pure-strategy Nashequilibria when the issue space has more than onedimension. This paper shows that the introduction ofvalence issues can create conditions where equilibriaexist, even in a multidimensional setting. We derivesufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria,and characterize the spatial locations of twocompeting parties or candidates when such equilibriaexist. The party with the advantage on the valencedimension will generally take a moderate position onthe positional issues. We consider the implications ofthese results for public perceptions of the parties,incumbency advantages, and realigning elections. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000 Ansolabehere Stephen Department of Political Science, MIT, 02139-000, Cambridge, MA, U.S.A. aut Snyder Jr. James Department of Political Science, MIT, 02139-000, Cambridge, MA, U.S.A. aut Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers 103/3-4(2000-06-01), 327-336 0048-5829 103:3-4<327 2000 103 11127 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005020606153 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005020606153 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Ansolabehere Stephen Department of Political Science, MIT, 02139-000, Cambridge, MA, U.S.A aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Snyder Jr James Department of Political Science, MIT, 02139-000, Cambridge, MA, U.S.A aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers 103/3-4(2000-06-01), 327-336 0048-5829 103:3-4<327 2000 103 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer