caa a22 4500 475841298 CHVBK 20180406123902.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170329e20000401xx s 000 0 eng 10.1023/A:1005033011215 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1023/A:1005033011215 Kirchgässner Gebhard SIASR, Institutsgebäude, University of St. Gallen, Dufourstr. 48, CH-9000, St. Gallen, Switzerland aut Probabilistic Voting and Equilibrium: An Impossibility Result [Elektronische Daten] [Gebhard Kirchgässner] The introduction of voters' uncertainty alone is in no way sufficient to guarantee an equilibrium outcome of a voting process. What is needed in addition is the assumption that the voting probabilities depend strictly convex respectively concave of the utility losses caused by the proposed policies of the different parties. This assumption is, however, not compatible with an unrestricted policy space, and it has to be rejected for theoretical as well as empirical reasons. Thus, using models of probabilistic voting we still have to accept that cycles can arise and electoral outcomes are prone to manipulation via agenda setting. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000 Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers 103/1-2(2000-04-01), 35-48 0048-5829 103:1-2<35 2000 103 11127 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005033011215 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005033011215 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Kirchgässner Gebhard SIASR, Institutsgebäude, University of St. Gallen, Dufourstr. 48, CH-9000, St. Gallen, Switzerland aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers 103/1-2(2000-04-01), 35-48 0048-5829 103:1-2<35 2000 103 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence SWISSBIB 031883869 BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer