caa a22 4500 475841409 CHVBK 20180406123902.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170329e20000401xx s 000 0 eng 10.1023/A:1005078532251 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1023/A:1005078532251 Kurrild-Klitgaard Peter Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus, DK-8000, Aarhus, Denmark aut The Constitutional Economics of Autocratic Succession [Elektronische Daten] [Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard] The paper extends and empirically tests GordonTullock's public choice theory of the nature of autocracy. A simple model of the relationship between constitutional rules governing succession in autocratic regimes and the occurrence of coups against autocrats is sketched. The model is applied to a case study of coups against monarchs in Denmark in the period ca. 935-1849. A clear connection is found between the specific constitutional rules governing succession and the frequency of coups. Specifically, the introduction of automatic hereditary succession inan autocracy provides stability and limits the number of coups conducted by contenders. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000 Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers 103/1-2(2000-04-01), 63-84 0048-5829 103:1-2<63 2000 103 11127 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005078532251 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005078532251 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Kurrild-Klitgaard Peter Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus, DK-8000, Aarhus, Denmark aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers 103/1-2(2000-04-01), 63-84 0048-5829 103:1-2<63 2000 103 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer