caa a22 4500 477048382 CHVBK 20180405111336.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960301xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF01254382 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF01254382 A note on correlated equilibrium [Elektronische Daten] [Fe. Evangelista, T. Raghavan] The set of correlated equilibria for a bimatrix game is a closed, bounded, convex set containing the set of Nash equilibria. We show that every extreme point of a maximal Nash set is an extreme point of the above convex set. We also give an example to show that this result is not true in the payoff space, i.e. there are games where no Nash equilibrium payoff is an extreme point of the set of correlated equilibrium payoffs. Physica-Verlag, 1996 Evangelista Fe University of Wisconsin Centers-Marathon, 518 South 7th Ave, 54401, Wausau, WI, USA aut Raghavan T. Department of Mathematics Statistics and Computer Science, The University of Illinois at Chicago, 322 Science and Engineering Offices, 60607-7045, Chicago, IL, USA aut International Journal of Game Theory Physica-Verlag 25/1(1996-03-01), 35-41 0020-7276 25:1<35 1996 25 182 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01254382 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01254382 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Evangelista Fe University of Wisconsin Centers-Marathon, 518 South 7th Ave, 54401, Wausau, WI, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Raghavan T. Department of Mathematics Statistics and Computer Science, The University of Illinois at Chicago, 322 Science and Engineering Offices, 60607-7045, Chicago, IL, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- International Journal of Game Theory Physica-Verlag 25/1(1996-03-01), 35-41 0020-7276 25:1<35 1996 25 182 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer