caa a22 4500 477048447 CHVBK 20180405111336.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960301xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF01254384 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF01254384 Funk Peter Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Adenaueralle 24-26, 53113, Bonn, Germany aut Auctions with interdependent valuations [Elektronische Daten] [Peter Funk] This paper analyses auctions in which the valuation of each player not only depends on whether he wins or not, but also on who is the winner if it is not him. Physica-Verlag, 1996 International Journal of Game Theory Physica-Verlag 25/1(1996-03-01), 51-64 0020-7276 25:1<51 1996 25 182 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01254384 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01254384 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Funk Peter Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Adenaueralle 24-26, 53113, Bonn, Germany aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- International Journal of Game Theory Physica-Verlag 25/1(1996-03-01), 51-64 0020-7276 25:1<51 1996 25 182 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer