caa a22 4500 477048455 CHVBK 20180405111336.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960901xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF02425258 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF02425258 An experimental study of constant-sum centipede games [Elektronische Daten] [Mark Fey, Richard McKelvey, Thomas Palfrey] In this paper, we report the results of a series of experiments on a version of the centipede game in which the total payoff to the two players is constant. Standard backward induction arguments lead to a unique Nash equilibrium outcome prediction, which is the same as the prediction made by theories of "fair” or "focal” outcomes. We find that subjects frequently fail to select the unique Nash outcome prediction. While this behavior was also observed in McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) in the "growing pie” version of the game they studied, the Nash outcome was not "fair”, and there was the possibility of Pareto improvement by deviating from Nash play. Their findings could therefore be explained by small amounts of altruistic behavior. There are no Pareto improvements available in the constant-sum games we examine. Hence, explanations based on altruism cannot account for these new data. We examine and compare two classes of models to explain these data. The first class consists of non-equilibrium modifications of the standard "Always Take” model. The other class we investigate, the Quantal Response Equilibrium model, describes an equilibrium in which subjects make mistakes in implementing their best replies and assume other players do so as well. One specification of this model fits the experimental data best, among the models we test, and is able to account for all the main features we observe in the data. Physica-Verlag, 1996 Fey Mark Department of Politics, Princeton University, 08544, Princeton, NJ, USA aut McKelvey Richard Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, 91125, Pasadena, CA, USA aut Palfrey Thomas Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, 91125, Pasadena, CA, USA aut International Journal of Game Theory Springer-Verlag 25/3(1996-09-01), 269-287 0020-7276 25:3<269 1996 25 182 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02425258 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02425258 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Fey Mark Department of Politics, Princeton University, 08544, Princeton, NJ, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- McKelvey Richard Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, 91125, Pasadena, CA, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Palfrey Thomas Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, 91125, Pasadena, CA, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- International Journal of Game Theory Springer-Verlag 25/3(1996-09-01), 269-287 0020-7276 25:3<269 1996 25 182 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer