caa a22 4500 477048463 CHVBK 20180405111336.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960901xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF02425262 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF02425262 An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate elections [Elektronische Daten] [Robert Forsythe, Thomas Rietz, Roger Myerson, Robert Weber] We report the results of elections conducted in a laboratory setting, modelled on a threecandidate example due to Borda. By paying subjects conditionally on election outcomes, we create electorates with (publicly) known preferences. We compare the results of experiments with and without non-binding pre-election polls under plurality rule, approval voting, and Borda rule. We also refer to a theory of voting "equilibria,” which makes sharp predictions concerning individual voter behavior and election outcomes. We find that Condorcet losers occasionally win regardless of the voting rule or presence of polls. Duverger's law (which asserts the predominance of two candidates) appears to hold under plurality rule, but close three-way races often arise under approval voting and Borda rule. Voters appear to poll and vote strategically. In elections, voters usually cast votes that are consistent with some strategic equilibrium. By the end of an election series, most votes are consistent with a single equilibrium, although that equilibrium varies by experimental group and voting rule. Physica-Verlag, 1996 Forsythe Robert College of Business Administration, University of Iowa, 52242, Iowa City, Ia, USA aut Rietz Thomas College of Business Administration, University of Iowa, 52242, Iowa City, Ia, USA aut Myerson Roger Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, 60208, Illinois, USA aut Weber Robert Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, 60208, Illinois, USA aut International Journal of Game Theory Springer-Verlag 25/3(1996-09-01), 355-383 0020-7276 25:3<355 1996 25 182 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02425262 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02425262 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Forsythe Robert College of Business Administration, University of Iowa, 52242, Iowa City, Ia, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Rietz Thomas College of Business Administration, University of Iowa, 52242, Iowa City, Ia, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Myerson Roger Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, 60208, Illinois, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Weber Robert Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, 60208, Illinois, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- International Journal of Game Theory Springer-Verlag 25/3(1996-09-01), 355-383 0020-7276 25:3<355 1996 25 182 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer