caa a22 4500 47704848X CHVBK 20180405111336.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960901xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF02425259 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF02425259 On expectations and the monetary stakes in ultimatum games [Elektronische Daten] [Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe, Vernon Smith] In an ultimatum game, player 1 makes an offer of $X from a total of $M to player 2. If player 2 accepts the offer, then player 1 is paid $(M-X) and player 2 receives $X; if player 2 rejects the offer, each gets zero. In the ultimatum game experiments reported in the literature,M is typically not more than $10 (see Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin and Sefton, 1994, hereafter FHSS; Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat and Smith, 1994, hereafter HMSS, and the literature cited therein). We report new results for 50 bargaining pairs in whichM=$100, and compare them with previous outcomes from 48 pairs withM=$10. The need for an examination of the effect of increased stakes on ultimatum bargaining is suggested by a literature survey of the effect of varying the stakes in a wide variety of decision making and market experiments over the last 33 years (Smith and Walker, 1993b). Many cases were found in which the predictions of theory were improved when the monetary rewards were increased. There were also cases in which the level of monetary rewards had no effect on the results. Consequently, it is necessary to examine the stakes question on a case by case basis. The previously reported effect of instructional changes, which define different institutional contexts, on ultimatum game outcomes, and the effect of stakes reported here, suggest a game formulation that explains changes in the behavior of both players as a result of changes in the instructional treatments. We formulate such a model and indicate how it might be further tested. Physica-Verlag, 1996 Hoffman Elizabeth College of Arts and Sciences, Iowa State University, 208 Carver Hall, 50011, Ames, Ia, USA aut McCabe Kevin University of Minnesota, USA aut Smith Vernon University of Arizona, USA aut International Journal of Game Theory Springer-Verlag 25/3(1996-09-01), 289-301 0020-7276 25:3<289 1996 25 182 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02425259 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02425259 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Hoffman Elizabeth College of Arts and Sciences, Iowa State University, 208 Carver Hall, 50011, Ames, Ia, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- McCabe Kevin University of Minnesota, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Smith Vernon University of Arizona, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- International Journal of Game Theory Springer-Verlag 25/3(1996-09-01), 289-301 0020-7276 25:3<289 1996 25 182 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer