caa a22 4500 47704851X CHVBK 20180405111336.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960901xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF02425260 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF02425260 Expectations and fairness in a simple bargaining experiment [Elektronische Daten] [Glenn Harrison, Kevin McCabe] We evaluate two competing hypotheses that try to account for robust violations of the predictions of game theory in Ultimatum bargaining experiments. One popular hypothesis is that the subjects are motivated by considerations of fairness that are not modelled by traditional theory. The alternative hypothesis is that the subjects do not have common knowledge of the rationality, beliefs and motives of other players. Each hypothesis can explain existing data. We design several experiments to discriminate between these two hypotheses. The results provide strong support for the alternative hypothesis. Physica-Verlag, 1996 Harrison Glenn Department of Economics, College of Business Administration, University of South Carolina, 29208, Columbia, SC, USA aut McCabe Kevin Department of Accounting, Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota, 55420, Minneapolis, MN, USA aut International Journal of Game Theory Springer-Verlag 25/3(1996-09-01), 303-327 0020-7276 25:3<303 1996 25 182 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02425260 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02425260 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Harrison Glenn Department of Economics, College of Business Administration, University of South Carolina, 29208, Columbia, SC, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- McCabe Kevin Department of Accounting, Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota, 55420, Minneapolis, MN, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- International Journal of Game Theory Springer-Verlag 25/3(1996-09-01), 303-327 0020-7276 25:3<303 1996 25 182 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer