caa a22 4500 477048528 CHVBK 20180405111336.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960901xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF02425261 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF02425261 Comparative statics of a signaling game: An experimental study [Elektronische Daten] [Jan Potters, Frans van Winden] In this paper a simple and basic signaling game is studied in an experimental environment. First, we check whether we can replicate some of the findings in the literature concerning equilibrium selection and the use and impact of costly signals. Second, and foremost, the comparative statics implications of the game are studied. The experimental results are related to the predictions of two competing behavioral models: a game model, in which subjects are assumed to behave in line with (refined) sequential equilibrium theory, and a decision model, in which subjects are assumed to behave as non-strategic decision makers. The experimental outcomes replicate the finding in the literature that costly messages are sent more frequently by ‘higher' sender types (whose information is such that persuasion is also profitable to the responder), and that such messages have an impact on the behavior of the responder. These results are consistent with (versions of) both the game model and the decision model. The comparative statics results, however, clearly point in the direction of the decision model. Play is most strongly affected by ‘own' payoff parameters, as predicted by the decision model, and less so by opponent's payoff parameters, as predicted by the mixed strategies of the refined sequential equilibrium. Particularly, a decision model in which players are assumed to adapt beliefs about opponents' choice probabilities in response to experience in previous play, appears to succeed best in organizing the data. Physica-Verlag, 1996 Potters Jan CREED/Department of Economics, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018WB, Amsterdam, The Netherlands aut van Winden Frans CREED/Department of Economics, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018WB, Amsterdam, The Netherlands aut International Journal of Game Theory Springer-Verlag 25/3(1996-09-01), 329-353 0020-7276 25:3<329 1996 25 182 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02425261 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02425261 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Potters Jan CREED/Department of Economics, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018WB, Amsterdam, The Netherlands aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- van Winden Frans CREED/Department of Economics, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018WB, Amsterdam, The Netherlands aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- International Journal of Game Theory Springer-Verlag 25/3(1996-09-01), 329-353 0020-7276 25:3<329 1996 25 182 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer