caa a22 4500 477048544 CHVBK 20180405111336.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19961201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF01803950 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF01803950 Equilibrium payoffs of dynamic games [Elektronische Daten] [Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme] We give a characterization of the equilibrium payoffs of a dynamic game, which is a stochastic game where the transition function is either one or zero and players can only use pure actions in each stage. The characterization is in terms of convex combinations of connected stationary strategies; since stationary strategies are not always connected, the equilibrium set may not be convex. We show that subgame perfection may reduce the equilibrium set. Physica-Verlag, 1996 Massó Jordi Departement d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Edifici B, 08193, Bellaterra (Barcelona), Spain aut Neme Alejandro Instituto de Matemátiça Aplicada San Luis, Universidad de San Luis, Ejército de los Andes 950, 5700, San Luis, Argentina aut International Journal of Game Theory Physica-Verlag 25/4(1996-12-01), 437-453 0020-7276 25:4<437 1996 25 182 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01803950 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01803950 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Massó Jordi Departement d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Edifici B, 08193, Bellaterra (Barcelona), Spain aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Neme Alejandro Instituto de Matemátiça Aplicada San Luis, Universidad de San Luis, Ejército de los Andes 950, 5700, San Luis, Argentina aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- International Journal of Game Theory Physica-Verlag 25/4(1996-12-01), 437-453 0020-7276 25:4<437 1996 25 182 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer