caa a22 4500 477048595 CHVBK 20180405111336.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19961201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF01803952 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF01803952 Ultimatums in two-person bargaining with one-sided uncertainty: Offer games [Elektronische Daten] [Amnon Rapoport, James Sundali] In the ultimatum game with complete information a Sender proposes a division of a given amount of surplus ("pie”), which a Receiver can either accept (payoffs are distributed according to the Sender's proposal) or reject (both players earn nothing). We study another version of the ultimatum game under incomplete informaton in which the pie is drawn randomly from a commonly known distribution, the Sender knows the exact size of the pie, but the Receiver only knows her share of the pie, not the residual share requested by the Sender. The basic results are that (1) as the support of the pie distribution increases in a mean-preserving spread, the Senders make lower offers that the Receivers are less likely to reject, (2) for a given support, Senders tend to offer a lower proportion of the pie to the Receivers as the pie size grows larger, and (3) although knowing only their share of the pie, Receivers estimate its size quite accurately. Physica-Verlag, 1996 Rapoport Amnon Department of Management and Policy, University of Arizona, 405 McClelland Hall, 85721, Tucson, AZ, USA aut Sundali James Department of Management and Policy, University of Arizona, 405 McClelland Hall, 85721, Tucson, AZ, USA aut International Journal of Game Theory Physica-Verlag 25/4(1996-12-01), 475-494 0020-7276 25:4<475 1996 25 182 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01803952 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01803952 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Rapoport Amnon Department of Management and Policy, University of Arizona, 405 McClelland Hall, 85721, Tucson, AZ, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Sundali James Department of Management and Policy, University of Arizona, 405 McClelland Hall, 85721, Tucson, AZ, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- International Journal of Game Theory Physica-Verlag 25/4(1996-12-01), 475-494 0020-7276 25:4<475 1996 25 182 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer