caa a22 4500 477048633 CHVBK 20180405111336.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960601xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF01247105 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF01247105 The nonemptiness of the f -core of a game without side payments [Elektronische Daten] [Mamoru Kaneko, Myrna Wooders] We prove the nonemptiness of the core of a continuum game without side payments where only small coalitions — ones bounded in absolute size of finite cardinality — are permitted. This result covers assignment games with a continuum of players and includes combinations of several assignment games, such as housing and automobile markets. Physica-Verlag, 1996 Kaneko Mamoru Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 24061, Blacksburg, VA, USA aut Wooders Myrna Department of Economics, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada aut International Journal of Game Theory Physica-Verlag 25/2(1996-06-01), 245-258 0020-7276 25:2<245 1996 25 182 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01247105 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01247105 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Kaneko Mamoru Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 24061, Blacksburg, VA, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Wooders Myrna Department of Economics, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- International Journal of Game Theory Physica-Verlag 25/2(1996-06-01), 245-258 0020-7276 25:2<245 1996 25 182 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer