caa a22 4500 477048706 CHVBK 20180405111336.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960601xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF01247098 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF01247098 Core, value and equilibria for market games: On a problem of Aumann and Shapley [Elektronische Daten] [Dan Butnariu, Erich Klement] In this note a partial solution of Open Problem 41C of Aumann and Shapley [1974, pp. 250-251] is presented. A sufficient condition for the Aumann-Shapley value of a market game to exist, to be contained in its core, and to be the competitive payoff distribution of a transferable utility competitive equilibrium is given. In this context, balancedness and σ-balancedness criteria for large classes of cooperative games are proven. Physica-Verlag, 1996 Butnariu Dan Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Haifa, 31905, Haifa, Israel aut Klement Erich Department of Mathematics, Johannes Kepler University, A-4040, Linz, Austria aut International Journal of Game Theory Physica-Verlag 25/2(1996-06-01), 149-160 0020-7276 25:2<149 1996 25 182 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01247098 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01247098 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Butnariu Dan Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Haifa, 31905, Haifa, Israel aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Klement Erich Department of Mathematics, Johannes Kepler University, A-4040, Linz, Austria aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- International Journal of Game Theory Physica-Verlag 25/2(1996-06-01), 149-160 0020-7276 25:2<149 1996 25 182 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer