caa a22 4500 477048714 CHVBK 20180405111337.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960601xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF01247101 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF01247101 The Nakamura Theorem for coalition structures of quota games [Elektronische Daten] [Rajat Deb, Shlomo Weber, Eyal Winter] This paper considers a model of society $$S$$ with a finite number of individuals,n, a finite set off alternatives, Ω effective coalitions that must contain ana priori given numberq of individuals. Its purpose is to extend the Nakamura Theorem (1979) to the quota games where individuals are allowed to form groups of sizeq which are smaller than the grand coalition. Our main result determines the upper bound on the number of alternatives which would guarantee, for a given e andq, the existence of a stable coalition structure for any profile of complete transitive preference relations. Our notion of stability, $$S$$ -equilibrium, introduced by Greenberg-Weber (1993), combines bothfree entry andfree mobility and represents the natural extension of the core to improper or non-superadditive games where coalition structures, and not only the grand coalition, are allowed to form. Physica-Verlag, 1996 Deb Rajat Department of Economics, Richard B. Johnson Center for Economic Studies, Dedman College, Southern Methodist University, 75275-0496, Dallas, Texas, USA aut Weber Shlomo Department of Economics, Richard B. Johnson Center for Economic Studies, Dedman College, Southern Methodist University, 75275-0496, Dallas, Texas, USA aut Winter Eyal The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel aut International Journal of Game Theory Physica-Verlag 25/2(1996-06-01), 189-198 0020-7276 25:2<189 1996 25 182 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01247101 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01247101 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Deb Rajat Department of Economics, Richard B. Johnson Center for Economic Studies, Dedman College, Southern Methodist University, 75275-0496, Dallas, Texas, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Weber Shlomo Department of Economics, Richard B. Johnson Center for Economic Studies, Dedman College, Southern Methodist University, 75275-0496, Dallas, Texas, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Winter Eyal The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- International Journal of Game Theory Physica-Verlag 25/2(1996-06-01), 189-198 0020-7276 25:2<189 1996 25 182 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer