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   <subfield code="a">Correlation properties of a general binary combiner with memory</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">Correlation properties of a general binary combiner with an arbitrary number M of memory bits are derived and novel design criteria proposed. For any positive integer m, the sum of the squares of the correlation coefficients between all nonzero linear functions of m successive output bits and all linear functions of the corresponding m successive inputs is shown to be dependent upon a particular combiner, unlike the memoryless combiners. The minimum and maximum values of the correlation sum as well as the necessary and sufficient conditions for them to be achieved are determined. It turns out that the security of combiners with memory can be considerably improved if M is not small. An efficient linear sequential circuit approximation (LSCA) method is developed for obtaining output and input linear functions with comparatively large correlation coefficients which is feasible for large M and works for any practical scheme. The method consists in deriving and solving a linear sequential circuit with additional nonbalanced inputs that is based on linear approximations of the output and the component next-state functions. The corresponding correlation attack on combiners with linear feedback shift registers is analyzed and it is shown that every such combiner with or without memory is essentially zero-order correlation immune.</subfield>
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