caa a22 4500 477076505 CHVBK 20180405111439.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960601xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF01581972 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF01581972 Batabyal Amitrajeet Department of Economics, Utah State University, 84322-3530, Logan, UT, USA aut Game models of environmental policy in an open economy [Elektronische Daten] [Amitrajeet Batabyal] In this paper we study some aspects of the question of international environmental regulation from a game theoretic perspective. We address two broad questions. First, we examine the circumstances under which the pursuit of unilateral environmental policy by a country in a Stackelberg game, will make that country worse off. Second, we study the effects of environmental regulation by means of alternate price control instruments in a Stackelberg game when there is transboundary pollution. We find that there are plausible theoretical circumstances in which the pursuit of unilateral environmental policy is not a good idea. Further, we show that in choosing between alternate pollution control instruments, national governments typically face a tradeoff between instruments which correct more distortions but are costly to implement and instruments which correct fewer distortions but are less costly to implement. In particular, we obtain a dominance result for a tariff policy; this result favors the use of tariffs from an informational standpoint alone. Springer-Verlag, 1996 The Annals of Regional Science Springer-Verlag 30/2(1996-06-01), 185-200 0570-1864 30:2<185 1996 30 168 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01581972 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01581972 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Batabyal Amitrajeet Department of Economics, Utah State University, 84322-3530, Logan, UT, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- The Annals of Regional Science Springer-Verlag 30/2(1996-06-01), 185-200 0570-1864 30:2<185 1996 30 168 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer