caa a22 4500 477077668 CHVBK 20180405111442.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960901xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00153231 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00153231 Vachris M. Christopher Newport University, 23606-2998, Newport News, VA aut Federal antitrust enforcement: A principal-agent perspective [Elektronische Daten] [M. Vachris] This paper offers a critical examination of the appropriateness of the traditional principal-agent model in describing the relationship between the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and its congressional oversight committees. After studying the institutional reality of congressional oversight, I extend the traditional principal-agent model to incorporate both the Antitrust Division and the President as important players in the determination of federal antitrust policy. My empirical analysis of Antitrust Division enforcement trends covers almost four decades, from 1950 through the end of the Reagan administration. The results provide substantial evidence that the property rights of the congressional oversight committees are seriously attenuated, leaving open the possibly for bureaucratic discretion. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996 Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; http://www.wkap.nl 88/3-4(1996-09-01), 223-238 0048-5829 88:3-4<223 1996 88 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00153231 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00153231 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Vachris M. Christopher Newport University, 23606-2998, Newport News, VA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; http://www.wkap.nl 88/3-4(1996-09-01), 223-238 0048-5829 88:3-4<223 1996 88 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer