caa a22 4500 477077757 CHVBK 20180405111443.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960901xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00153232 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00153232 Bawn Kathleen Department of Political Science, University of California, 90024-1472, Los Angeles, CA aut Strategic responses to institutional change: Parties, committees and multiple referral [Elektronische Daten] [Kathleen Bawn] Although multiple referral seems to remove committees' gatekeeping power, strategic opportunities exist for motivated committees to dominate late stages of the legislative process. Multiple referral does not necessarily diminish the power of committees, but it does solve an important problem for the leadership. If the goal of the leadership is to maximize the number of majority party members reelected, it will make procedural decisions to favor groups within the majority party that care the most about the issue. Multiple referral provides the leadership with information about preference intensity when jurisdiction is unclear. The committee willing to exert the most effort for a bill, even if this effort takes the form of strategic behavior, is the committee most affected by the issue. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996 Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; http://www.wkap.nl 88/3-4(1996-09-01), 239-258 0048-5829 88:3-4<239 1996 88 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00153232 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00153232 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Bawn Kathleen Department of Political Science, University of California, 90024-1472, Los Angeles, CA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; http://www.wkap.nl 88/3-4(1996-09-01), 239-258 0048-5829 88:3-4<239 1996 88 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer