caa a22 4500 477077889 CHVBK 20180405111443.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960701xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00130410 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00130410 The political temptations of rationing by insiders [Elektronische Daten] [George Von Furstenberg, Nicholas Spangenberg] Long waits for goods, services, and jobs to become available still exist in and to the east of Europe. This paper explores the political economy of what has made pervasive rationing an attractive way to cope with shocks in the past. The explanation advanced lies not in the creation of shortage rents for the personal profit of corrupt insiders controlling the production and distribution process. Instead, rationing with queuing is viewed as a "populist” scheme that allows a majority to keep its wages above levels that would clear the labor market while hiding the cost of such a policy, increased unemployment. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996 Von Furstenberg George Department of Economics, Indiana University, 47405, Bloomington, IN aut Spangenberg Nicholas Department of Economics, Indiana University, 47405, Bloomington, IN aut Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; http://www.wkap.nl 88/1-2(1996-07-01), 69-81 0048-5829 88:1-2<69 1996 88 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00130410 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00130410 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Von Furstenberg George Department of Economics, Indiana University, 47405, Bloomington, IN aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Spangenberg Nicholas Department of Economics, Indiana University, 47405, Bloomington, IN aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; http://www.wkap.nl 88/1-2(1996-07-01), 69-81 0048-5829 88:1-2<69 1996 88 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer