caa a22 4500 477077900 CHVBK 20180405111443.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960701xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00130414 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00130414 Almekinders Geert International Monetary Fund, 700 19th Street, N.W., 20431, Washington, D.C. aut The political economy of central bank intervention [Elektronische Daten] [Geert Almekinders] This paper analyzes an exchange rate policy game between a central bank and rational speculators under symmetric information. The central bank tries to counteract shocks to the exchange rate by means of sterilized intervention working through the expectations channel. Private speculators resist being fooled. They anticipate the interventions. An "intervention bias” results with an inefficiently high equilibrium volume of intervention which does not reduce the impact of shocks to the exchange rate. The model implies that the more independent the central bank the smaller and the more consistent the intervention efforts. An empirical illustration lends some support to the model. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996 Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; http://www.wkap.nl 88/1-2(1996-07-01), 127-146 0048-5829 88:1-2<127 1996 88 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00130414 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00130414 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Almekinders Geert International Monetary Fund, 700 19th Street, N.W., 20431, Washington, D.C aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; http://www.wkap.nl 88/1-2(1996-07-01), 127-146 0048-5829 88:1-2<127 1996 88 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer