caa a22 4500 477077919 CHVBK 20180405111443.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960701xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00130406 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00130406 Stratmann Thomas Department of Agricultural Economics and Economics, Montana State University, 59717, Bozeman, MT aut Instability of collective decisions? Testing for cyclical majorities [Elektronische Daten] [Thomas Stratmann] The issues of cyclical majorities and instability of collective choices have been in the fore-front in the discussion of social choice mechanisms. Cycling, lack of equilibria, and so called chaos theorems have been prevalent in the public choice literature. Whether cycling actually occurs in processes that are decided by majority rule has been a long-standing question. However, cycling has not been made quantifiable nor has it been clear how one would determine empirically whether majorities are cyclical. In this paper, cycling has been given an empirical meaning. This paper provides a method to test for cyclical majorities and applies it to decisions made in the US Congress. The test results indicate stability and the presence of persistent winners and losers in Congress. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996 Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; http://www.wkap.nl 88/1-2(1996-07-01), 15-28 0048-5829 88:1-2<15 1996 88 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00130406 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00130406 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Stratmann Thomas Department of Agricultural Economics and Economics, Montana State University, 59717, Bozeman, MT aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; http://www.wkap.nl 88/1-2(1996-07-01), 15-28 0048-5829 88:1-2<15 1996 88 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer