caa a22 4500 477077927 CHVBK 20180405111443.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960701xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00130416 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00130416 Tax rates, tax administration and income tax evasion in Switzerland [Elektronische Daten] [Werner Pommerehne, Hannelore Weck-Hannemann] This paper contains an empirical analysis of income tax noncompliance in Switzerland, based on the standard model of tax evasion. Noncompliance is found to be positively related to the marginal tax burden and negatively to the probability of audit, though the latter impact is only weak. There is no evidence of a significant deterrent effect of the penalty tax. The extended model reveals that noncompliance is positively related to inflation. Finally, noncompliance is significantly lower when citizens/taxpayers have direct control over government budgets, whereas the opposite holds when there is no such control. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996 Pommerehne Werner University of Saarland, Germany aut Weck-Hannemann Hannelore University of Innsbruck, Austria aut Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; http://www.wkap.nl 88/1-2(1996-07-01), 161-170 0048-5829 88:1-2<161 1996 88 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00130416 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00130416 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Pommerehne Werner University of Saarland, Germany aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Weck-Hannemann Hannelore University of Innsbruck, Austria aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; http://www.wkap.nl 88/1-2(1996-07-01), 161-170 0048-5829 88:1-2<161 1996 88 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer