caa a22 4500 477077943 CHVBK 20180405111443.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960701xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00130415 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00130415 Borck Rainald Department of Economics, Humboldt University Berlin, D-10178, Berlin, Germany aut Ideology and interest groups [Elektronische Daten] [Rainald Borck] This paper analyzes the interaction between ideological shirking by legislators and interest group activities in a two stage game between a legislator, a challenger, and an interest group. Some comparative statics results are derived. In some circumstances, campaign contributions decrease as the legislator shirks more; they increase with committee power and seniority, other things equal. An empirical test provides some support for this model. The interpretation of those results is made difficult by the methodological problems of ideological shirking measures. It is problematic to interpret the standard residual as ideological shirking because it ignores the effect of campaign contributions on legislative voting. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996 Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; http://www.wkap.nl 88/1-2(1996-07-01), 147-160 0048-5829 88:1-2<147 1996 88 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00130415 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00130415 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Borck Rainald Department of Economics, Humboldt University Berlin, D-10178, Berlin, Germany aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; http://www.wkap.nl 88/1-2(1996-07-01), 147-160 0048-5829 88:1-2<147 1996 88 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer