caa a22 4500 47707796X CHVBK 20180405111443.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19961201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00159360 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00159360 Iida Keisuke Department of Politics, Princeton University, 08544, Princeton, NJ, U.S.A. aut Involuntary defection in two-level games [Elektronische Daten] [Keisuke Iida] Ratification failures are prevalent in international relations, but due to the assumption of unitary actors in international relations theory, theoretical analysis has been underdeveloped. In formalizing Putnam's metaphor of two-level games, this article shows that incomplete information about the preferences of domestic actors is crucial for understanding ratification failures. Furthermore, institutional mechanisms affect bargaining outcomes through their impact on information revelation. In particular, it is found that two-sided constraints lead to relatively equitable bargaining outcomes and that renegotiation and pre-negotiation poll-taking can induce strategic voting by domestic constituents, thereby exacerbating domestic constraints. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996 Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; http://www.wkap.nl 89/3-4(1996-12-01), 283-303 0048-5829 89:3-4<283 1996 89 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00159360 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00159360 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Iida Keisuke Department of Politics, Princeton University, 08544, Princeton, NJ, U.S.A aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; http://www.wkap.nl 89/3-4(1996-12-01), 283-303 0048-5829 89:3-4<283 1996 89 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer