caa a22 4500 477077978 CHVBK 20180405111443.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19961201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00159359 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00159359 Esposto Fred Department of Economics, Eastern Michigan University, 48197, Ypsilaniti, MI, U.S.A. aut The political economy of taking and just compensation [Elektronische Daten] [Fred Esposto] By creating an implicit right to judicial review and lowering the transaction costs a property owner must incur to challenge a taking, the just compensation restriction on eminent domain limits the tendency of political decision-makers to avoid the subjective costs their actions inflict on property owners and moves the level of taking closer to the social optimum. Its impact, however, is partially to completely erased by the risk aversion of the property owner and the fiscal illusion of the political decision-maker, unless there are additional constraints in the fiscal constitution. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996 Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; http://www.wkap.nl 89/3-4(1996-12-01), 267-282 0048-5829 89:3-4<267 1996 89 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00159359 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00159359 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Esposto Fred Department of Economics, Eastern Michigan University, 48197, Ypsilaniti, MI, U.S.A aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; http://www.wkap.nl 89/3-4(1996-12-01), 267-282 0048-5829 89:3-4<267 1996 89 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer