caa a22 4500 477077994 CHVBK 20180405111443.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19961201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00159363 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00159363 Berggren Niclas Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, S-113 83, Stockholm, Sweden aut Social order through constitutional choice: A contractarian proposal [Elektronische Daten] [Niclas Berggren] The present paper consists of two closely related parts: one which outlines a normative criterion for evaluating the legitimacy of constitutional change and one which specifies a particular proposal of a constitution. The criterion used stems directly from the "pragmatic" brand of contractarianism developed by Buchanan, where an approximate rule of unanimity is utilized. The proposal aims at the highest possible freedom of choice for individuals when it comes to defining the political system of their liking: a core (dealing with public goods and rights) is common for all, but everything else can vary between different sub-constitutions between which individuals choose. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996 Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; http://www.wkap.nl 89/3-4(1996-12-01), 339-361 0048-5829 89:3-4<339 1996 89 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00159363 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00159363 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Berggren Niclas Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, S-113 83, Stockholm, Sweden aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; http://www.wkap.nl 89/3-4(1996-12-01), 339-361 0048-5829 89:3-4<339 1996 89 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer