caa a22 4500 47707801X CHVBK 20180405111443.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19961201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00159357 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00159357 Bailey Martin Department of Economics, Emory University, 30322, Atlanta, GA, U.S.A. aut Implementation of the Thompson mechanism [Elektronische Daten] [Martin Bailey] This paper reconsiders the largely overlooked Thompson insurance mechanism for public choice. The mechanism's apparent defects can be remedied by a multi-part mechanism that generates necessary information and corrects potential errors. The added parts are (a) a sample of the population of eligible voters, who prepare a program for all voters' approval, and (b) the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves pivot mechanism. One can use classical statistical methods to draw valid inferences from a population sample about the entire electorate, preserving incentive compatibility and permitting efficient outcomes. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996 Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; http://www.wkap.nl 89/3-4(1996-12-01), 231-243 0048-5829 89:3-4<231 1996 89 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00159357 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00159357 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Bailey Martin Department of Economics, Emory University, 30322, Atlanta, GA, U.S.A aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; http://www.wkap.nl 89/3-4(1996-12-01), 231-243 0048-5829 89:3-4<231 1996 89 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer