caa a22 4500 477078052 CHVBK 20180405111443.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19961201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00159358 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00159358 Equilibrium and efficiency in an organized vote market [Elektronische Daten] [Tomas Philipson, James Snyder Jr.] We study an organized market for votes, in which trade is directed by a market "specialist". This market mechanism always produces an equilibrium outcome, and whenever vote buying occurs the alternative chosen is Pareto superior to the alternative that would be chosen without trade. We then characterize the equilibrium outcomes in a one-dimensional policy space, and show that if the distribution of ideal points is skewed enough, then the equilibrium with vote buying differs from the equilibrium without vote buying (the median ideal point). This difference reflects the ability of an intense minority to obtain a policy it prefers in exchange for side-payments. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996 Philipson Tomas Department of Economics, University of Chicago, Chicago, U.S.A. aut Snyder Jr. James Department of Political Science, Massachussets Institute of Technology, Massachussets, U.S.A. aut Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; http://www.wkap.nl 89/3-4(1996-12-01), 245-265 0048-5829 89:3-4<245 1996 89 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00159358 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00159358 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Philipson Tomas Department of Economics, University of Chicago, Chicago, U.S.A aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Snyder Jr James Department of Political Science, Massachussets Institute of Technology, Massachussets, U.S.A aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; http://www.wkap.nl 89/3-4(1996-12-01), 245-265 0048-5829 89:3-4<245 1996 89 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer