caa a22 4500 477078257 CHVBK 20180405111444.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960301xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00136523 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00136523 Downes Thomas Department of Economics, Northwestern University, 60208-2600, Evanston, IL, U.S.A. aut An examination of the structure of governance in California school districts before and after Proposition 13 [Elektronische Daten] [Thomas Downes] This paper explores the structure of governance in California school districts. Two alternative models are considered, the decisive voter (benevolent dictator) model and a model that allows for rent-seeking behavior on the part of district decision makers. A formal test between these two models is proposed and implemented. The decisive voter model is found wanting as an explanation of school district decision making both before and after the passage of Proposition 13. There is, however, some evidence that the constraints imposed on some districts by Proposition 13 have forced decision makers to act in a manner more consistent with the preferences of their constituents. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996 Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; gopher://gopher.wkap.nl 86/3-4(1996-03-01), 279-307 0048-5829 86:3-4<279 1996 86 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00136523 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00136523 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Downes Thomas Department of Economics, Northwestern University, 60208-2600, Evanston, IL, U.S.A aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; gopher://gopher.wkap.nl/ 86/3-4(1996-03-01), 279-307 0048-5829 86:3-4<279 1996 86 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer