caa a22 4500 477078273 CHVBK 20180405111444.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960301xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00136519 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00136519 Crane Randall Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of California, 92717-5150, Irvine, CA, U.S.A. aut Efficient local charity with self-selection [Elektronische Daten] [Randall Crane] How is charitable giving within a city influenced by the prospect of donor and recipient migration? The theoretical literature on charitable contributions in a closed economy has mainly argued that the market level of private giving will tend to be lower than optimal, wherever there exists a local fiscal externality between donors and recipients. Interjurisdictional models of voluntary redistribution, on the other hand, abstract from altruism to explore the interjurisdictional fiscal externality resulting from the failure of one community to account for the migration impacts of its actions on other communities. This paper integrates and extends both literatures by allowing for local altruism among the mobile residents of a system of local economies. Within a single community, mobility thus introduces adverse selection considerations for each donor via the migration of both recipients and other donors. Moreover, any change in the local transfer level influences both equilibrium wages and donor behavior system-wide. The analysis demonstrates that the market level of local charitable giving will be lower than is either ‘locally' or ‘globally' optimal in some cases and plausibly higher than optimal in others, depending on the effect of migration and expectations on wages. The self-selection nature of donor decision making does eliminate the usual interjurisdictional fiscal externality, though it leaves a role for government intervention via subsidies to altruistic behavior. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996 Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; gopher://gopher.wkap.nl 86/3-4(1996-03-01), 209-222 0048-5829 86:3-4<209 1996 86 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00136519 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00136519 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Crane Randall Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of California, 92717-5150, Irvine, CA, U.S.A aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; gopher://gopher.wkap.nl/ 86/3-4(1996-03-01), 209-222 0048-5829 86:3-4<209 1996 86 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer