caa a22 4500 477078281 CHVBK 20180405111444.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960301xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00136524 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00136524 Steunenberg Bernard Faculty of Public Administration and Public Policy, University of Twente, 7500 AE, Enschede, The Netherlands aut Agent discretion, regulatory policymaking, and different institutional arrangements [Elektronische Daten] [Bernard Steunenberg] This paper examines agent discretion that is a result of the structure of the legislative process. Based on several distributions of lawmaking powers, different games are analyzed in which players decide on regulatory policies. The analysis shows that agent discretion increases as lawmaking powers are differentiated and assigned to specialized players. Particularly, monopoly initiation power, which allows a player to act as a gatekeeper, has a substantial impact on discretion. Agent discretion will be even larger when these players also have heterogenous preferences. The framework that is developed in this paper permits comparisons across different political systems with regard to agent discretion and legislative control on policymaking. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996 Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; gopher://gopher.wkap.nl 86/3-4(1996-03-01), 309-339 0048-5829 86:3-4<309 1996 86 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00136524 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00136524 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Steunenberg Bernard Faculty of Public Administration and Public Policy, University of Twente, 7500 AE, Enschede, The Netherlands aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; gopher://gopher.wkap.nl/ 86/3-4(1996-03-01), 309-339 0048-5829 86:3-4<309 1996 86 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer