caa a22 4500 477078311 CHVBK 20180405111444.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960301xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00136525 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00136525 Plurality versus proportional representation: An analysis of Sicilian elections [Elektronische Daten] [Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra, Carmela Nicosia] The competing merits of plurality and proportional representation have intrigued political economists and political scientists for quite some time. Of primary interest is whether one or the other system is better in serving the interests of the electorate. Since theoreticians are unable to unambiguously determine the answer to this question, the issue must ultimately be decided empirically. We use data from Sicilian elections, where the system was recently altered towards the system of plurality. We are able to demonstrate that the proportional representation system engenders greater information among voters and elicits greater commitment from them than plurality. We are also able to show that in larger towns increased information causes a more dispersed vote under a proportional representation system; further, this result does not hold under plurality. This may have some implications for the size of positional rents reaped by political parties under the two electoral systems. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996 Mudambi Ram Department of Economics, University of Buckingham, MK18 1EG, Buckingham, U.K. aut Navarra Pietro Department of Economics, University of Buckingham, MK18 1EG, Buckingham, U.K. aut Nicosia Carmela Department of Economics, University of Buckingham, MK18 1EG, Buckingham, U.K. aut Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; gopher://gopher.wkap.nl 86/3-4(1996-03-01), 341-357 0048-5829 86:3-4<341 1996 86 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00136525 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00136525 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Mudambi Ram Department of Economics, University of Buckingham, MK18 1EG, Buckingham, U.K aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Navarra Pietro Department of Economics, University of Buckingham, MK18 1EG, Buckingham, U.K aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Nicosia Carmela Department of Economics, University of Buckingham, MK18 1EG, Buckingham, U.K aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; gopher://gopher.wkap.nl/ 86/3-4(1996-03-01), 341-357 0048-5829 86:3-4<341 1996 86 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer