caa a22 4500 477078338 CHVBK 20180405111444.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960101xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00114875 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00114875 Mason T. Department of Political Science, University of Memphis, 38152, TN, U.S.A. aut Insurgency, counterinsurgency, and the rational peasant [Elektronische Daten] [T. Mason] Many rational choice treatments of guerrilla insurgency have focused on the strategic calculus by which government and insurgent elites use the tactical weapons of coercion and benefits to win the support of nonelites. This paper uses Frohlich and Oppenheimer's model of the rational tax payer/tax evader to develop a model of the decision calculus by which nonelites respond to the tactical behavior of elites and thereby choose between supporting the incumbent regime, its insurgent opposition or neither. This model is then used to assess the likely impact of various insurgent and counterinsurgent tactics on nonelite support and loyalty. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996 Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; gopher://gopher.wkap.nl 86/1-2(1996-01-01), 63-83 0048-5829 86:1-2<63 1996 86 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00114875 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00114875 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Mason T. Department of Political Science, University of Memphis, 38152, TN, U.S.A aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; gopher://gopher.wkap.nl/ 86/1-2(1996-01-01), 63-83 0048-5829 86:1-2<63 1996 86 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer