caa a22 4500 477078354 CHVBK 20180405111444.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960101xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00114872 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00114872 Shmanske Stephen Department of Economics, California State University, 94542 3060, Hayward, CA, U.S.A. aut Contestability, queues, and governmental entry deterrence [Elektronische Daten] [Stephen Shmanske] This paper demonstrates that a perverse kind of entry deterrence can result when government subsidized production is combined with non-price rationing in the form of queuing. Even though queuing leads to a total cost to the consumer (not including the tax cost) that is higher than the cost of an unsubsidized private supplier, and even though the government's money price is rigid, the market is not contestable. The key to the result is that the waiting cost portion of the consumer's acquisition cost declines immediately upon entry and losses would be forced upon the entrant. Privatization would negate the entry deterrence, thus leading to entry, increased output at lower full prices, lower average production costs, decreased waiting costs, increased profits, and increased consumer surplus. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996 Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; gopher://gopher.wkap.nl 86/1-2(1996-01-01), 1-15 0048-5829 86:1-2<1 1996 86 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00114872 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00114872 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Shmanske Stephen Department of Economics, California State University, 94542 3060, Hayward, CA, U.S.A aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; gopher://gopher.wkap.nl/ 86/1-2(1996-01-01), 1-15 0048-5829 86:1-2<1 1996 86 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer