caa a22 4500 477078397 CHVBK 20180405111444.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960101xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00114877 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00114877 Price discrimination in a rent-seeking economy [Elektronische Daten] [Francis Cheung, Xinghe Wang] This paper examines the incentive and the consequences of using discriminatory pricing by a monopolist in a rent-seeking economy. It is shown that, even if all consumer groups' demands have identical elasticities at any given price, the monopolist has an incentive to charge a lower price to high pressure consumer groups so as to alleviate their rent-seeking efforts in challenging its monopolistic power. Furthermore, it is shown that by allowing the firm to price discriminate total welfare may increase, even if all rent-seeking expenditures are completely wasteful. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996 Cheung Francis Department of Economics, University of Missouri-Columbia, 65211, Columbia, MO, U.S.A. aut Wang Xinghe Department of Economics, University of Missouri-Columbia, 65211, Columbia, MO, U.S.A. aut Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; gopher://gopher.wkap.nl 86/1-2(1996-01-01), 103-116 0048-5829 86:1-2<103 1996 86 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00114877 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00114877 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Cheung Francis Department of Economics, University of Missouri-Columbia, 65211, Columbia, MO, U.S.A aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Wang Xinghe Department of Economics, University of Missouri-Columbia, 65211, Columbia, MO, U.S.A aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; gopher://gopher.wkap.nl/ 86/1-2(1996-01-01), 103-116 0048-5829 86:1-2<103 1996 86 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer