caa a22 4500 477078400 CHVBK 20180405111444.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960101xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00114874 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00114874 Free-rider effects in rent-seeking groups competing for public goods [Elektronische Daten] [Edna Loehman, Fabrice Quesnel, Emerson Babb] This paper studies individual behavior within a group when there is rent-seeking and groups compete in the selection of a public good — a variant of the traditional public goods problem. The situation is different from traditional public goods because an individual may not receive no reward for contribution to the group if the group does not win. Based on theory, the optimal contribution varies strategically depending on the characteristics of the situation, individual risk preferences, income, and subjective probability of winning. Individual contributions or bids toward a group objective were tested experimentally. Results showed that use of a demand revealing mechanism did not produce a significant difference in individual contributions to group efforts when the level of reward was low and when rewards were indirect. However, the demand revealing mechanism caused a significant difference in bids when rewards were high and direct, thus indicating free-riding behavior. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996 Loehman Edna Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University, 47907, West Lafayette, IN, U.S.A. aut Quesnel Fabrice Societé O.H.F., Asnieres, France aut Babb Emerson Food & Resource Economics Department, University of Florida, 32611, Gainesville, FL, U.S.A. aut Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; gopher://gopher.wkap.nl 86/1-2(1996-01-01), 35-61 0048-5829 86:1-2<35 1996 86 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00114874 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00114874 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Loehman Edna Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University, 47907, West Lafayette, IN, U.S.A aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Quesnel Fabrice Societé O.H.F., Asnieres, France aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Babb Emerson Food & Resource Economics Department, University of Florida, 32611, Gainesville, FL, U.S.A aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; gopher://gopher.wkap.nl/ 86/1-2(1996-01-01), 35-61 0048-5829 86:1-2<35 1996 86 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer