caa a22 4500 477078435 CHVBK 20180405111444.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960601xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00118649 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00118649 Koehler David School of Public Affairs, The American University, 20016, Washington DC aut Committee choice and the core under supramajority rule: Results from simulation of majority choice in 2-dimensional space [Elektronische Daten] [David Koehler] While simple-majority choice by committees is generally unstable, supramajority rule has been demonstrated to yield nonempty sets of stable outcomes: outcomes in the core. This paper reports results of a computer simulation of majority choice by committees under supramajority rule. The object is to explore the transition from unstable to stable committee choice with increasing supramajority rules. The findings are that supramajority rule limits the instability of committee choice; that stable committee choice is no more predictable than unstable committee choice; and that an optimal supramajority rule can be specified which minimizes instability and maximizes the predictability of committee choice. In all of the results, simple-majority rule plays virtually no role. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996 Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; http://www.wkap.nl 87/3-4(1996-06-01), 281-301 0048-5829 87:3-4<281 1996 87 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00118649 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00118649 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Koehler David School of Public Affairs, The American University, 20016, Washington DC aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; http://www.wkap.nl 87/3-4(1996-06-01), 281-301 0048-5829 87:3-4<281 1996 87 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer