caa a22 4500 477078451 CHVBK 20180405111444.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960601xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00118654 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00118654 Wirl Franz Institut für Energiewirtschaft, Technische Universität Wien, Gu→hausstr. 27-29, A-1040, Wien, Austria aut Can Leviathan governments mitigate the tragedy of the commons? [Elektronische Daten] [Franz Wirl] This paper explores the conjecture whether the Leviathan motive of politicians — to tax for the purpose of raising revenues rather than for benevolent, Pigovian motives — helps to overcome the inefficiency of international pollution spillovers such as in the cases of acid rain and global warming. It turns out that this conjecture is true in a static context that captures flow externalities, e.g., acid rain, as long as environmental damages are not too high. In contrast, Leviathan motives aggravate the already existing inefficiency in the case of stock externalities (e.g., global warming) despite probably high taxes at the beginning. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996 Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; http://www.wkap.nl 87/3-4(1996-06-01), 363-377 0048-5829 87:3-4<363 1996 87 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00118654 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00118654 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Wirl Franz Institut für Energiewirtschaft, Technische Universität Wien, Gu→hausstr. 27-29, A-1040, Wien, Austria aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; http://www.wkap.nl 87/3-4(1996-06-01), 363-377 0048-5829 87:3-4<363 1996 87 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer