caa a22 4500 47707863X CHVBK 20180405111444.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960401xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00151727 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00151727 Some empirical evidence on rent-seeking [Elektronische Daten] [R. Beck, J. Connolly] We tested for the capture of net gains by winners in rent-seeking competitions, using the most prominent announcements of government favors in the Canadian economy over a twelve-year period. Stockholders' returns were not significantly different from zero. One possible explanation is that government assists firms only when assistance creates political gains. Refusing to transfer economic rents to firms maximmizes the resources available to serve political purposes. This kind of behavior by government officials would imply that government has market power, which is consistent with several well-known theories of government. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996 Beck R. Faculty of Business, University of Alberta, T6G 2R6, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada aut Connolly J. T6J 3J6, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada aut Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; gopher://gopher.wkap.nl 87/1-2(1996-04-01), 19-33 0048-5829 87:1-2<19 1996 87 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00151727 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00151727 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Beck R. Faculty of Business, University of Alberta, T6G 2R6, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Connolly J. T6J 3J6, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; gopher://gopher.wkap.nl/ 87/1-2(1996-04-01), 19-33 0048-5829 87:1-2<19 1996 87 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer