caa a22 4500 477078648 CHVBK 20180405111444.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960401xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00151735 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00151735 A multi-winner nested rent-seeking contest [Elektronische Daten] [Derek Clark, Christian Riis] This paper considers a symmetric imperfectly discriminating rent-seeking contest in which there may be several winners. We first demonstrate a serious flaw in previous work and then go on to suggest an alternative method for analyzing the contest. In contrast to the previous work, we show that the value of the rent is fully dissipated in equilibrium as the number of players becomes large. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996 Clark Derek Department of Economics NFH, University of Tromsø, 9037, Tromsø, Norway aut Riis Christian Foundation for Research in Economics and Business Administration (SNF), Gaustadalléen 21, 0371, Oslo, Norway aut Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; gopher://gopher.wkap.nl 87/1-2(1996-04-01), 177-184 0048-5829 87:1-2<177 1996 87 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00151735 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00151735 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Clark Derek Department of Economics NFH, University of Tromsø, 9037, Tromsø, Norway aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Riis Christian Foundation for Research in Economics and Business Administration (SNF), Gaustadalléen 21, 0371, Oslo, Norway aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers; gopher://gopher.wkap.nl/ 87/1-2(1996-04-01), 177-184 0048-5829 87:1-2<177 1996 87 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer