caa a22 4500 477091326 CHVBK 20180405111515.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19960901xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF01237881 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF01237881 Whence tit-for-tat? [Elektronische Daten] [Philip Crowley, R. Sargent] Summary: In theoretical and empirical studies of the evolution of cooperation, the tit-for-tat strategy (i.e. cooperate unless your partner did not cooperate in the previous interaction) is widely considered to be of central importance. Nevertheless, surprisingly little is known about the conditions in which tit-for-tat appears and disappears across generations in a population of interacting individuals. Here, we apply a newly developed classifier-system model (EvA) in addressing this issue when the key features of interactions are caricatured using the iterated prisoner's dilemma game. Our simple representation of behavioural strategies as algorithms composed of two interacting rules allowed us to determine conditions in which tit-for-tat can replace noncooperative strategies and vice versa. Using direct game-theoretic analysis and simulations with the EvA model, we determined that no strategy is evolutionarily stable, but larger population sizes and longer sequences of interactions between individuals can yield transient dominance by tit-for-tat. Genetic drift among behaviourally equivalent strategies is the key mechanism underlying this dominance. Our analysis suggests that tit-for-tat could be important in nature for cognitively simple organisms of limited memory capacity, in strongly kin-selected or group-selected populations, when interaction sequences between individuals are relatively short, in moderate-sized populations of widely interacting individuals and when defectors appear in the population with moderate frequency. Chapman & Hall, 1996 classifier system nationallicence evolution of cooperation nationallicence game theory nationallicence genetic algorithm nationallicence iterated prisoner's dilemma nationallicence reciprocal altruism nationallicence Crowley Philip Center for Ecology, Evolution and Behavior and T.H. Morgan School of Biological Sciences, University of Kentucky, 40506-0225, Lexington, KY, USA aut Sargent R. Center for Ecology, Evolution and Behavior and T.H. Morgan School of Biological Sciences, University of Kentucky, 40506-0225, Lexington, KY, USA aut Evolutionary Ecology Kluwer Academic Publishers 10/5(1996-09-01), 499-516 0269-7653 10:5<499 1996 10 10682 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01237881 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01237881 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Crowley Philip Center for Ecology, Evolution and Behavior and T.H. Morgan School of Biological Sciences, University of Kentucky, 40506-0225, Lexington, KY, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Sargent R. Center for Ecology, Evolution and Behavior and T.H. Morgan School of Biological Sciences, University of Kentucky, 40506-0225, Lexington, KY, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Evolutionary Ecology Kluwer Academic Publishers 10/5(1996-09-01), 499-516 0269-7653 10:5<499 1996 10 10682 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer