caa a22 4500 477129676 CHVBK 20180405111701.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19970701xx s 000 0 eng 10.1023/A:1007705623147 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1023/A:1007705623147 Anas Alex University at Buffalo, State University of New York, Amherst, New York aut Rent Control with Matching Economies: A Model of European Housing Market Regulation [Elektronische Daten] [Alex Anas] Housing markets are thin, and consumer search for housing is costly, time consuming, and risky. Mismatches between tenants and dwellings are common in a laissez-faire market. There are scale economies in accumulating tenants and houses and then matching them up to improve welfare. In many European countries, some housing is rent controlled and rationed by public centralized matching. Waiting time, risk in rationing, and risk in matching are costs that arise from such regulation. We show that welfare improvements over laissez-faire occur if gains from centralized matching can offset the decrease in housing quality, the possible increase in waiting times, and the risks in rationing induced by rent controls. Under regulation, there is a welfare maximizing partition of the stock into free and controlled markets; and contrary to observed practice, it is often welfare improving to set controlled rents above (not below) laissez-faire, which increases the supply offered for centralized matching and the opportunity for a better match. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997 The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics Kluwer Academic Publishers 15/1(1997-07-01), 111-137 0895-5638 15:1<111 1997 15 11146 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007705623147 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007705623147 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Anas Alex University at Buffalo, State University of New York, Amherst, New York aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics Kluwer Academic Publishers 15/1(1997-07-01), 111-137 0895-5638 15:1<111 1997 15 11146 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer