caa a22 4500 477129838 CHVBK 20180405111701.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170330e19970501xx s 000 0 eng 10.1023/A:1007770831648 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1023/A:1007770831648 TURNBULL GEOFFREY Department of Economics, Louisiana State University, 70803-6306, Baton Rouge, LA aut Multiple Listing Service Subsidies and Economic Efficiency [Elektronische Daten] [GEOFFREY TURNBULL] In an earlier article in this journal, Sefton and Yavas (1995) concluded that subsidizing a monopoly multiple listing service (MLS) can be efficient when the curvature of the representative consumer's demand function leads to overshifting. This paper extends their analysis to a multiple-consumer demand model. It shows that, for the generalized demand configuration considered here, in general, there is no Pareto superior MLS subsidy supportable by nondiscriminatory MLS consumer taxes when the Pareto ranking is imposed without the Hicks-Kaldor compensation principle. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997 multiple listing service nationallicence efficient subsidy nationallicence The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics Kluwer Academic Publishers 14/3(1997-05-01), 365-370 0895-5638 14:3<365 1997 14 11146 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007770831648 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007770831648 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- TURNBULL GEOFFREY Department of Economics, Louisiana State University, 70803-6306, Baton Rouge, LA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics Kluwer Academic Publishers 14/3(1997-05-01), 365-370 0895-5638 14:3<365 1997 14 11146 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer