<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim">
 <record>
  <leader>     naa a22        4500</leader>
  <controlfield tag="001">510735835</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="003">CHVBK</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="005">20180411083009.0</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="007">cr unu---uuuuu</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="008">180411e20130801xx      s     000 0 eng  </controlfield>
  <datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">10.1007/s11573-013-0680-6</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">doi</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">(NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s11573-013-0680-6</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Trockel</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Jan</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">Department of Economics and Business Administration, FernUniversität in Hagen, Universitätsstraße 41/ESG, 58084, Hagen, Germany</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">Changing bonuses and the resulting effects of employees' incentives to an inspection game</subfield>
   <subfield code="h">[Elektronische Daten]</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">[Jan Trockel]</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">The following paper analyses an intraorganizational conflict in materials management between a manager, a controller and the company management. By using a game theoretic approach, this paper especially seeks to answer the question: ‘Do bonuses change employees' incentives when the focus is directed at the control level of company management?' This analysis is based upon an application of a three-person inspection game. Within the three-person game a partial influence of a variation of penalties and bonuses is measured analytically. A simultaneous variation of the bonuses for the subordinated players, as the incentive effect to guarantee rational behaviour, is presented here as a simulation. While different intervals of bonus values, which also affect the payoff of the company management, and their influence on the equilibrium probabilities are examined, it becomes apparent that bonuses are able to neutralize each other in their effect on improved decision-making behaviours of the manager (inspectee) and the controller (inspector). But also a diverse variation leads to positive and negative effects on the manager's behaviour.</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="540" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2013</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Inspection game</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Non-cooperative three-person-model</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Decision theory</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">C72</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">M11</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="t">Journal of Business Economics</subfield>
   <subfield code="d">Springer Berlin Heidelberg</subfield>
   <subfield code="g">83/7(2013-08-01), 759-783</subfield>
   <subfield code="x">0044-2372</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">83:7&lt;759</subfield>
   <subfield code="1">2013</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">83</subfield>
   <subfield code="o">11573</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-013-0680-6</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">text/html</subfield>
   <subfield code="z">Onlinezugriff via DOI</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="908" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="D">1</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">research-article</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">jats</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">856</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">40</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-013-0680-6</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">text/html</subfield>
   <subfield code="z">Onlinezugriff via DOI</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">100</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">1-</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">Trockel</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Jan</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">Department of Economics and Business Administration, FernUniversität in Hagen, Universitätsstraße 41/ESG, 58084, Hagen, Germany</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">773</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">0-</subfield>
   <subfield code="t">Journal of Business Economics</subfield>
   <subfield code="d">Springer Berlin Heidelberg</subfield>
   <subfield code="g">83/7(2013-08-01), 759-783</subfield>
   <subfield code="x">0044-2372</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">83:7&lt;759</subfield>
   <subfield code="1">2013</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">83</subfield>
   <subfield code="o">11573</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="900" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Metadata rights reserved</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">Springer special CC-BY-NC licence</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="898" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">BK010053</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">XK010053</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">XK010000</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="949" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="F">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">NL-springer</subfield>
  </datafield>
 </record>
</collection>
