naa a22 4500 510783856 CHVBK 20180411083255.0 cr unu---uuuuu 180411e20130301xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s13164-012-0129-9 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s13164-012-0129-9 Rupert Robert Department of Philosophy, University of Colorado, Boulder Hellems 169, UCB 232, 80309-0232, Boulder, CO, USA aut "Memory, Natural Kinds, and Cognitive Extension; or, Martians Don't Remember, and Cognitive Science Is Not about Cognition” [Elektronische Daten] [Robert Rupert] This paper evaluates the Natural-Kinds Argument for cognitive extension, which purports to show that the kinds presupposed by our best cognitive science have instances external to human organism. Various interpretations of the argument are articulated and evaluated, using the overarching categories of memory and cognition as test cases. Particular emphasis is placed on criteria for the scientific legitimacy of generic kinds, that is, kinds characterized in very broad terms rather than in terms of their fine-grained causal roles. Given the current state of cognitive science, I conclude that we have no reason to think memory or cognition are generic natural kinds that can ground an argument for cognitive extension. Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht, 2013 Review of Philosophy and Psychology Springer Netherlands 4/1(2013-03-01), 25-47 1878-5158 4:1<25 2013 4 13164 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-012-0129-9 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-012-0129-9 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Rupert Robert Department of Philosophy, University of Colorado, Boulder Hellems 169, UCB 232, 80309-0232, Boulder, CO, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Review of Philosophy and Psychology Springer Netherlands 4/1(2013-03-01), 25-47 1878-5158 4:1<25 2013 4 13164 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer