naa a22 4500 510784011 CHVBK 20180411083256.0 cr unu---uuuuu 180411e20131201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s13164-013-0153-4 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s13164-013-0153-4 Cain M. Department of History, Philosophy and Religion, Oxford Brookes University, Harcourt Hill Campus, OX2 9AT, Oxford, UK aut Learning, Concept Acquisition and Psychological Essentialism [Elektronische Daten] [M. Cain] In this article I will evaluate the popular view that we acquire most of our concepts by means of learning. I will do this through an examination of Jerry Fodor's dissenting views and those of some of his most persistent and significant critics. Although I will be critical of Fodor's central claim that it is impossible to learn a concept, I will ultimately conclude that we should be more sceptical than is normal about the power of learning when it comes to concept acquisition, particularly with respect to natural kind concepts. Central to my argument for this conclusion will be an examination of the bearings of psychological essentialism on concept acquisition. Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht, 2013 Review of Philosophy and Psychology Springer Netherlands 4/4(2013-12-01), 577-598 1878-5158 4:4<577 2013 4 13164 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-013-0153-4 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-013-0153-4 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Cain M. Department of History, Philosophy and Religion, Oxford Brookes University, Harcourt Hill Campus, OX2 9AT, Oxford, UK aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Review of Philosophy and Psychology Springer Netherlands 4/4(2013-12-01), 577-598 1878-5158 4:4<577 2013 4 13164 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer