naa a22 4500 510784046 CHVBK 20180411083256.0 cr unu---uuuuu 180411e20131201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s13164-013-0155-2 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s13164-013-0155-2 Truth, Correspondence, and Gender [Elektronische Daten] [Robert Barnard, Joseph Ulatowski] Philosophical theorizing about truth manifests a desire to conform to the ordinary or folk notion of truth. This practice often involves attempts to accommodate some form of correspondence. We discuss this accommodation project in light of two empirical projects intended to describe the content of the ordinary conception of truth. One, due to Arne Naess, claims that the ordinary conception of truth is not correspondence. Our more recent study is consistent with Naess' result. Our findings suggest that contextual factors and respondent gender affect whether the folk accept that correspondence is sufficient for truth. These findings seem to show that the project of accommodating the ordinary notion of truth is more difficult than philosophers had anticipated because it is fragmentary. Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht, 2013 Barnard Robert University of Mississippi, University, MS, USA aut Ulatowski Joseph University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY, USA aut Review of Philosophy and Psychology Springer Netherlands 4/4(2013-12-01), 621-638 1878-5158 4:4<621 2013 4 13164 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-013-0155-2 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-013-0155-2 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Barnard Robert University of Mississippi, University, MS, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Ulatowski Joseph University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Review of Philosophy and Psychology Springer Netherlands 4/4(2013-12-01), 621-638 1878-5158 4:4<621 2013 4 13164 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer